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 I study an evolutionary game model with idiosyncratic ﬁtness.
 The model behaves differently from other models such as the bimatrix game.
 Polarization of strategies in different subpopulations often occurs.
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a b s t r a c t
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be
heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the
game owing to heterogeneity in idiosyncratic preferences, ﬁghting abilities, and positions in a social
network. In such a population, an individual may imitate successful and similar others, where similarity
refers to that in the idiosyncratic ﬁtness function. I propose an evolutionary game model with two
subpopulations on the basis of multipopulation replicator dynamics to describe such a situation. In the
proposed model, pairs of players are involved in a two-person game as a well-mixed population, and
imitation occurs within subpopulations in each of which players have the same payoff matrix. It is shown
that the model does not allow any internal equilibrium such that the dynamics differs from that of other
related models such as the bimatrix game. In particular, even a slight difference in the payoff matrix in
the two subpopulations can make the opposite strategies to be stably selected in the two subpopulations
in the snowdrift and coordination games.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A basic assumption underlying many evolutionary and economic
game theoretical models is that individuals are the same except for
possible differences in the strategy that they select. In fact, a
population of individuals involved in ecological or social interaction
is considered to be heterogeneous. For example, different individuals
may have different ﬁghting abilities or endowments (Landau, 1951;
Hammerstein, 1981; Maynard Smith, 1982; McNamara et al., 1999),
occupy different positions in contact networks specifying the peers
with whom the game is played (Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Jackson,
2008), or have different preferences over the objective outcome of
the game. The last situation is succinctly represented by the Battle of
the Sexes game in which a wife and husband prefer to go to watch
opera and football, respectively, whereas their stronger priority is on
going out together (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) (the Battle of the Sexes
game here is different from the one that models conﬂicts between
males and females concerning parental investment as described in
Dawkins (1976), Schuster and Sigmund (1981), Maynard Smith
(1982), Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), and Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1998). In behavioral game experiments, the heterogeneity of sub-
jects is rather a norm than exceptions (e.g., Camerer, 2003). For
example, some humans are cooperative in the public goods game
and others are not (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Jacquet et al., 2012),
and some punish non-cooperators more than others do (Fehr and
Gächter, 2002; Dreber et al., 2008).
Evolution of strategies in such a heterogeneous population is
the focus of the present paper. This question has been examined
along several lines.
First, in theory of preference, it is assumed that individuals
maximize their own idiosyncratic utilities that vary between
individuals. The utility generally deviates from the ﬁtness on
which evolutionary pressure operates (e.g., Sandholm, 2001;
Dekel et al., 2007; Alger and Weibull, 2012; Grund et al., 2013).
In fact, experimental evidence shows that individuals tend to
imitate behavior of similar others in the context of diffusion of
innovations (Rodgers, 2003) and health behavior (Centola, 2011).
Also in the context of economic behavior described as games,
individuals may preferentially imitate similar others because
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similar individuals are expected to be interested in maximizing
similar objective functions. This type of behavior is not considered
in previous preference models in which individuals can instanta-
neously maximize their own payoffs, and selection occurs on the
basis of the ﬁtness function common to the entire population. The
model proposed in this study deals with evolutionary dynamics in
which individuals in a heterogeneous population mimic successful
and similar others. The similarity here refers to that in the
idiosyncratic preference.
Second, evolution in heterogeneous populations has been
investigated with the use of the evolutionary bimatrix game
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, 1998; Weibull, 1995). A payoff
bimatrix describes the payoff imparted to the two players in
generally asymmetric roles. In its evolutionary dynamics, a popu-
lation is divided into two subpopulations, pairs of individuals
selected from the different subpopulations play the game, and
selection occurs within each subpopulation. The population then
has bipartite structure induced by the ﬁxed role of individuals.
However, the most generic population structure for investigating
interplay of evolution via social learning and idiosyncratic prefer-
ences would be a well-mixed population without ﬁxed roles of
individuals.
Third, evolutionary game dynamics on heterogeneous social
networks (Szabó and Fáth, 2007) is related to evolution in
heterogeneous populations. In most of the studies on this topic,
the payoff to an individual per generation is deﬁned as the
obtained payoff summed over all the neighboring individuals.
Then, cooperation in social dilemma games is enhanced on
heterogeneous networks (Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Durán and
Mulet, 2005; Santos et al., 2006). In this framework, hubs (i.e.,
those with many neighbors) and non-hubs are likely to gain
different payoffs mainly because of their positions in the contact
network. In particular, if the payoff of a single game is assumed to
be nonnegative, hubs tend to earn more than non-hubs simply
because hubs have more neighbors than non-hubs by deﬁnition
(Masuda, 2007). However, as long as the contact network is ﬁxed,
a non-hub player will not gain a large payoff by imitating the
strategy of a successful hub neighbor. The number of neighbors
serves as the resource of a player. Then, it may be more natural to
assume that players imitate successful others with a similar
number of neighbors.
Motivated by these examples, I examine evolutionary dynamics
in which a player would imitate successful others having similar
preferences or inhabiting similar environments. I divide the
players into two subpopulations depending on the subjective
perception of the result of the game; one may like a certain
outcome of the game, and another may not like the same outcome.
Imitation is assumed to occur within each subpopulation. How-
ever, the interaction occurs as a well-mixed population. I also
assume that all the individuals have the same ability, i.e., no player
is more likely to “win” the game than others.
2. Model
Consider a population comprising two subpopulations of players
such that the payoff matrix depends on the subpopulation. The
payoff is equivalent to the ﬁtness in the present model. I call the
game the subjective payoff game. Each player, independent of the
subpopulation, selects either of the two strategies denoted by A and
B. The case with a general number of strategies can be analogously
formulated. The subjective payoff game and its replicator dynamics
described in the following are a special case of the multipopulation
game proposed before (Taylor, 1979; Schuster et al., 1981a) (for
slightly different variants, see Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1988; Weibull, 1995).
The population is inﬁnite, well-mixed, and consists of a fraction
p ð0opo1Þ of type X players and a fraction 1p of type Y players.
The subjective payoff matrices that an X player and a Y player
perceive as row player are deﬁned by
A
B
A B
aX bX
cX dX
 !
and A
B
A B
aY bY
cY dY
 !
; ð1Þ
respectively. It should be noted that the payoff that an X player, for
example, perceives depends on the opponent's strategy (i.e., A or
B) but not on the opponent's type (i.e., X or Y). The use of the two
payoff matrices represents different idiosyncrasies in preferences
in the two subpopulations. Alternatively, the payoff matrix differs
by subpopulations because X and Y players have different tenden-
cies to transform the result of the one-shot game (i.e., one of the
four consequences composed of a pair of A and B) into the ﬁtness.
For example, X and Y players may beneﬁt the most from mutual A
and mutual B, respectively.
The fractions of X and Y players that select strategy A are
denoted by x and y, respectively. The fractions of X and Y players
that select strategy B are equal to 1x and 1y, respectively. The
payoffs to an X player with strategies A and B are given by
πX;A ¼ aX ½pxþð1pÞyþbX ½pð1xÞþð1pÞð1yÞ ð2Þ
and
πX;B ¼ cX ½pxþð1pÞyþdX ½pð1xÞþð1pÞð1yÞ; ð3Þ
respectively. The payoff to a Y player is deﬁned with X replaced by
Y in Eqs. (2) and (3).
I assume that in the evolutionary dynamics, the players can
only copy the strategies of peers in the same subpopulation. This
assumption reﬂects the premise that the payoff in the present
model is subjective such that the only comparison that makes
sense is that between the players in the same subpopulation. The
replicator dynamics of the subjective payoff game is then deﬁned
by
_x ¼ x½πX;AðxπX;Aþð1xÞπX;BÞ ¼ xð1xÞfðaXcXÞ½pxþð1pÞy
þðbXdXÞ½pð1xÞþð1pÞð1yÞg ð4Þ
and
_y ¼ yð1yÞfðaYcY Þ½pxþð1pÞyþðbYdY Þ½pð1xÞþð1pÞð1yÞg;
ð5Þ
where _x and _y represent the time derivatives.
3. General results
3.1. Absence of internal equilibrium
If (x, y) is an internal equilibrium (i.e., 0ox; yo1) of the
replicator dynamics given by Eqs. (4) and (5), ðaXcXÞ½pxþ
ð1pÞyþðbXdXÞ½pð1xÞþð1pÞð1yÞ ¼ ðaYcY Þ½pxþð1pÞyþ
ðbYdY Þ½pð1xÞþð1pÞð1yÞ ¼ 0 must be satisﬁed. However,
this is impossible unless a degenerate condition ðaXcXÞ
ðbYdY Þ ¼ ðaYcY ÞðbXdXÞ is satisﬁed. Therefore, for a generic
pair of payoff matrices, the replicator dynamics does not have an
internal equilibrium.
Three remarks are in order. First, the absence of internal
equilibrium implies that the present dynamics does not allow
limit cycles (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, 1998). Second, the
present result contrasts with that for a two-subpopulation
dynamics in which the perceived payoff matrix depends on the
opponent's subpopulation as well as on the focal player's sub-
population. In the latter case, an internal equilibrium or limit cycle
can exist (Schuster et al., 1981a). Third, the present conclusion is
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different from that for the bimatrix game. In the bimatrix game,
each player in subpopulation X exclusively interacts with each
player in subpopulation Y. Then, an internal equilibrium can exist,
whereas, when it exists, it is either a saddle or a neutrally
stable point surrounded by periodic orbits (Pohley and Thomas,
1979; Selten, 1980; Schuster et al., 1981b; Maynard Smith, 1982;
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, 1998).
3.2. Invariance under the transformation of payoff matrices
The replicator dynamics without population structure, which is
referred to as the ordinary replicator dynamics in the following, is
invariant under some transformations of the payoff matrix. The
dynamics given by Eqs. (4) and (5) is also invariant under some
payoff transformations.
First, trajectories of the ordinary replicator equation are invar-
iant under the addition of a common constant to all the entries of
the payoff matrix. Similarly, replacing the payoff matrices given by
Eq. (1) by
aXþhX bXþhX
cXþhX dXþhX
 !
and
aYþhY bY þhY
cY þhY dY þhY
 !
; ð6Þ
where hX and hY are arbitrary constants, does not alter the
dynamics.
Second, trajectories of the ordinary replicator equation are
invariant under multiplication of all the entries of the payoff
matrix by a common positive constant. It only changes the time
scale. In the present model, replacing Eq. (1) by
kaX kbX
kcX kdX
 !
and
kaY kbY
kcY kdY
 !
; ð7Þ
where k40, does not alter the dynamics. It should be noted that
the multiplicative factor for the two payoff matrices has to be the
same for the dynamics to be conserved.
Third, in the ordinary replicator equation, adding a common
constant to any column of the payoff matrix does not alter a
trajectory. In the present model, replacing Eq. (1) by
aXþhX;A bXþhX;B
cXþhX;A dXþhX;B
 !
and
aY þhY ;A bYþhY ;B
cY þhY ;A dY þhY ;B
 !
ð8Þ
does not alter the trajectory for arbitrary hX;A, hX;B, hY ;A, and hY ;B.
This invariance is a generalization of the ﬁrst invariance. It is also
equivalent to the invariance relationship found for a more general
model (Schuster and Sigmund, 1981).
3.3. Condition for ESS
Let us calculate the conditions for the combination of pure
strategies in each subpopulation to be evolutionarily stable stra-
tegies (ESSs). Some deﬁnitions of ESS for multipopulation games
exist (Taylor, 1979; Schuster et al., 1981a; Cressman, 1992, 1996;
Cressman et al., 2001), and it seems that consensus on the
deﬁnition of the ESS in the case of multiple subpopulations has
not been reached (Weibull, 1995). Here I adhere to the deﬁnition
given in Taylor (1979) (also see Schuster et al., 1981a), which was
proposed for general two-subpopulation games in which intra-
subpopulation and inter-subpopulation interactions yield a differ-
ent payoff to a focal player.
I start with stating the deﬁnition of the ESS by obeying Taylor
(1979). Consider a general two-subpopulation matrix game such
that there are m and n pure strategies in subpopulations X and Y,
respectively. A mixed strategy in X and Y is parametrized as
x¼ ðx1 x2 ⋯ xmÞ> and y¼ ðy1 y2 ⋯ ynÞ> , where xi ð1r irmÞ and
yi ð1r irnÞ are the probabilities that the mixed strategy in X and
Y takes the ith strategy, respectively, ∑mi ¼ 1xi ¼∑ni ¼ 1yi ¼ 1, and >
denotes the transposition. Consider a population of resident
players taking strategies x and y in subpopulations X and Y,
respectively. I assume that the payoff to a player adopting mixed
strategy x0 in subpopulation X embedded in this resident popula-
tion is given by
x0> ðRXXxþRXYyÞ: ð9Þ
Similarly, assume that the payoff to mixed strategy y0 in subpopula-
tion Y embedded in the same resident population is given by
y0> ðRYXxþRYYyÞ: ð10Þ
Strategy ðx; yÞ is ESS if for any ðx0; y0Þaðx; yÞ,
x0> ðRXXxþRXYyÞþy0> ðRYXxþRYYyÞ
rx> ðRXXxþRXYyÞþy> ðRYXxþRYYyÞ: ð11Þ
When the equality holds in Eq. (11), it is also required that an
additional condition given by
x0> ðRXXx0 þRXYy0Þþy0> ðRYXx0 þRYYy0Þ
ox> ðRXXx0 þRXYy0Þþy> ðRYXx0 þRYYy0Þ ð12Þ
is satisﬁed.
In the case of the subjective payoff game, I obtain m¼ n¼ 2,
RXX ¼ p
aX bX
cX dX
 !
; ð13Þ
RXY ¼ ð1pÞ
aX bX
cX dX
 !
; ð14Þ
RYX ¼ p
aY bY
cY dY
 !
; ð15Þ
RYY ¼ ð1pÞ
aY bY
cY dY
 !
; ð16Þ
x1 ¼ x, x2 ¼ 1x, y1 ¼ y, and y2 ¼ 1y. Therefore, Eqs. (11) and (12)
are reduced to
½ðxx0ÞðaXcX bXdX Þþðyy0ÞðaYcY bYdY Þ
 p x
1x
 
þð1pÞ
y
1y
 !" #
Z0 ð17Þ
and
½ðxx0ÞðaXcX bXdX Þþðyy0ÞðaYcY bYdY Þ
 p x
0
1x0
 
þð1pÞ
y0
1y0
 !" #
40 ð18Þ
respectively.
3.4. Pure strategy ESSs
In this section, let us identify the pure strategy ESSs of the
subjective payoff game. First, suppose that the population in which
all players in both subpopulations adopt strategy A is evolutiona-
rily stable. By substituting x¼ y¼ 1 in Eq. (17), I obtain
ð1x0ÞðaXcXÞþð1y0ÞðaY cY ÞZ0: ð19Þ
Because Eq. (19) must hold true for 0rx0o1 and y0 ¼ 1, a
necessary condition reads aXZcX . If aXZcX is satisﬁed with
equality, Eq. (18) for the same 0rx0o1 and y0 ¼ 1, i.e.,
ð1x0ÞðaXcX bXdXÞ p
x0
1x0
 
þð1pÞ 1
0
  
40 ð20Þ
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must be satisﬁed. By substituting aX¼cX in Eq. (20), I obtain bX4dX .
The necessary conditions obtained so far are summarized as
aX4cX or ðaX ¼ cX and bX4dXÞ: ð21Þ
These conditions are the same as the ESS conditions for the
structureless population. By considering the mutant parametrized
by x0 ¼ 1 and 0ry0o1, I similarly obtain the necessary conditions
for subpopulation Y as
aY4cY or ðaY ¼ cY and bY4dY Þ: ð22Þ
On the other hand, if Eqs. (21) and (22) are satisﬁed, Eqs. (17) and
(18) are satisﬁed for any ðx0; y0Þa ð1;1Þ. Therefore, Eqs. (21) and (22)
provide the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for strategy A to be
evolutionarily stable. In conclusion, A is evolutionarily stable for the
entire population if A is evolutionarily stable in each subpopulation
in the ordinary sense. Similarly, B is an ESS of the subjective payoff
game if B is evolutionarily stable in each subpopulation.
Next, assume that the population in which all the players in
subpopulations X and Y adopt A and B, respectively, is evolutio-
narily stable. By substituting x¼1 and y¼0 in Eq. (17), I obtain
ð1x0Þ½ðaXcXÞpþðbXdX Þð1pÞþy0½ðaY cY ÞpþðbY dY Þð1pÞZ0:
ð23Þ
Because Eq. (23) must hold true for 0rx0o1 and y0 ¼ 0, a
necessary condition reads
aXpþbXð1pÞZcXpþdXð1pÞ: ð24Þ
If Eq. (24) is satisﬁed with equality, Eq. (18) for the same 0rx0o1
and y0 ¼ 0, i.e.,
ð1x0ÞðaXcX bXdX Þ p
x0
1x0
 
þð1pÞ 0
1
  
40; ð25Þ
must be satisﬁed. By substituting aXpþbXð1pÞ ¼ cXpþdXð1pÞ in
Eq. (25), I obtain
bX4dX : ð26Þ
Similarly, by considering the mutant parametrized by x0 ¼ 1 and
0ry0o1, I obtain
aYpþbY ð1pÞrcYpþdY ð1pÞ: ð27Þ
When Eq. (27) is satisﬁed with equality, Eq. (18) and
aYpþbY ð1pÞ ¼ cYpþdY ð1pÞ lead to
aYocY : ð28Þ
The population given by (x,y)=(1,0) is an ESS if Eqs. (24) and (27)
are satisﬁed, Eq. (26) holds true when Eq. (24) is satisﬁed with
equality, and Eq. (28) holds true when Eq. (27) is satisﬁed with
equality. It should be noted that the conditions given by Eqs. (24)
and (27) depend on p.
3.5. Non-equivalence to the bimatrix game
In this section, I show that the replicator equation of the
subjective payoff game cannot be mapped to the replicator
equation of a bimatrix game. It should be noted that the following
arguments can be readily generalized to the case of an arbitrary
number of strategies.
In the bimatrix game in the well-mixed population, we con-
sider all possible pairs of a player in subpopulation X and a player
in subpopulation Y. The two selected players are involved in a two
person game, which is generally asymmetric. The payoff bimatrix
is given by
A
B
A B
ð ~aX ; ~aY Þ ð ~bX ; ~cY Þ
ð~cX ; ~bY Þ ð ~dX ; ~dY Þ
 !
; ð29Þ
where the ﬁrst and second elements in each entry of the bimatrix
represent the payoffs imparted to an X player and a Y player,
respectively. The row and column players correspond to subpo-
pulations X and Y, respectively. The payoff to an X player with
strategies A and B is equal to ~aXyþ ~bXð1yÞ and ~cXyþ ~dXð1yÞ,
respectively. Then, the replicator equation for subpopulation X is
given by
_x ¼ xð1xÞ½ð ~aX ~cXÞyþð ~bX ~dXÞð1yÞ: ð30Þ
Similarly,
_y ¼ yð1yÞ½ð ~aY  ~cY Þxþð ~bY ~dY Þð1xÞ: ð31Þ
If the dynamics given by Eqs. (30) and (31) is equivalent to that
for the subjective payoff game Eqs. (4) and (5), the comparison of
Eqs. (4) and (30) yields pðaXbXcXþdXÞ ¼ 0 because the right-
hand side of Eq. (4) must be independent of x except for the
multiplication factor xð1xÞ. Because p¼0 implies a structureless
population, aXbXcXþdX ¼ 0 holds true. Under this condition,
Eq. (4) is reduced to _x ¼ xð1xÞðbXdXÞ. Then, ~aX ~bX ~cXþ ~dX ¼ 0
and ~bX ~dX ¼ bXdX must hold true. Similarly, aY bY
cYþdY ¼ ~aY  ~bY  ~cYþ ~dY ¼ 0 and ~bY ~dY ¼ bY dY must hold true.
Except for this degenerate case, the two dynamics are not mapped
from one to the other.
4. Examples
4.1. Snowdrift game
Consider the snowdrift game, also called the chicken game or
the hawk-dove game, which represents a social dilemma situation
(Sugden, 1986; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004). The snowdrift game in
two subpopulations in which the payoff matrix for a player
depends on the opponent's subpopulation as well as the focal
player's subpopulation is analyzed in Auger et al. (2001). In the
case without population structure, a standard payoff matrix for the
snowdrift game is given by
A
B
A B
β12 β1
β 0
 !
; ð32Þ
where β41. Strategies A and B correspond to cooperation and
defection, respectively. If the opponent cooperates, it is better to
defect. Otherwise, it is better to cooperate. The mixed population
with a fraction of A players given by xn ¼ ð2β2Þ=ð2β1Þ is the
unique ESS.
Consider the case in which the β value depends on the sub-
population. Denote by βX and βY the subpopulation-dependent β
value such that
aX bX
cX dX
 !
¼ βX
1
2 βX1
βX 0
 !
ð33Þ
and
aY bY
cY dY
 !
¼ βY 
1
2 βY 1
βY 0
 !
: ð34Þ
Without loss of generality, I assume that βX4βY41.
Equations (4) and (5) read, respectively,
_x ¼ xð1xÞ ðβX1Þ βX
1
2
 
½pxþð1pÞy
 
; ð35Þ
_y ¼ yð1yÞ ðβY 1Þ βY 
1
2
 
½pxþð1pÞy
 
: ð36Þ
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Therefore, I obtain
_x40; _y40 if pxþð1pÞyo βY 1βY 1=2;
_x40; _yo0 if βY 1βY 1=2opxþð1pÞyo
βX 1
βX 1=2;
_xo0; _yo0 if pxþð1pÞy4 βX 1βX 1=2:
8>><
>>:
ð37Þ
Equation (37) implies that the replicator dynamics has the unique
stable equilibrium whose location depends on the p value. If
0opo ðβY 1Þ=ðβY 1=2Þ, the stable equilibrium is located at
ðxn; ynÞ ¼ 1;  p
1pþ
βY1
ð1pÞðβY 1=2Þ
 
: ð38Þ
An example of this case is shown in Fig. 1(a). This equilibrium is an
ESS, which is shown in Appendix with the use of the ESS criterion
established in Taylor (1979). If ðβY1Þ=ðβY1=2Þrpr ðβX1Þ=
ðβX1=2Þ, the stable equilibrium is located at
ðxn; ynÞ ¼ ð1;0Þ: ð39Þ
An example of this case is shown in Fig. 1(b). In this case, the
equilibrium is an ESS because Eqs. (24), (26), (27), and (28) are
satisﬁed. Finally, if ðβX1Þ=ðβX1=2Þopo1, the stable equili-
brium is located at
ðxn; ynÞ ¼ βX1
pðβX1=2Þ
;0
 
: ð40Þ
An example of this case is shown in Fig. 1(c). This equilibrium is
also an ESS (see Appendix for the proof). In all three cases, X, i.e.,
the subpopulation with the larger β value, has a larger fraction of A
players than Y does.
In particular, at least one subpopulation is monomorphic for
any p; A monopolizes subpopulation X, or B monopolizes sub-
population Y. Even a slight difference in the payoff matrix (i.e., β
value) in the two subpopulations yields polarization of the
strategies. Similar polarization also occurs in the bimatrix snow-
drift game. However, the internal equilibrium exists but is a saddle
in the case of the bimatrix game (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)
such that the mechanism is different from that for the subjective
payoff snowdrift game.
4.2. Coordination game
Consider a coordination game in which the players in different
subpopulations have different preferences to one strategy over the
other. Speciﬁcally, let us set the payoff matrix for subpopulations X
and Y to
aX bX
cX dX
 !
¼
1þαX 0
0 1αX
 !
ð41Þ
and
aY bY
cY dY
 !
¼
1þαY 0
0 1αY
 !
; ð42Þ
respectively, where 1oαYo0oαXo1. Players in X and Y prefer
strategies A and B, respectively. Eqs. (41) and (42) can be regarded
as a payoff bimatrix of the Battle of the Sexes game (Luce and
Raiffa, 1957). However, in the bimatrix game, the population is
composed of two subpopulations corresponding to the roles in the
game. In contrast, the players in the present game do not have
roles and interact in a well-mixed population.
Given Eqs. (41) and (42), Eqs. (4) and (5) read, respectively,
_x ¼ xð1xÞ½pð2x1Þþð1pÞð2y1ÞþαX ; ð43Þ
_y ¼ yð1yÞ½pð2x1Þþð1pÞð2y1ÞþαY : ð44Þ
Near x¼ y¼ 1, pð2x1Þþð1pÞð2y1ÞþαX4pð2x1Þþð1pÞ
ð2y1ÞþαY40 is satisﬁed. Therefore, ðxn; ynÞ ¼ ð1;1Þ is a stable
equilibrium of the replicator equations of the subjective payoff
coordination game. Because Eqs. (21) and (22) are satisﬁed with
Eqs. (41) and (42), ðxn; ynÞ ¼ ð1;1Þ is an ESS. Similarly, because
pð2x1Þþð1pÞð2y1ÞþαYopð2x1Þþð1pÞð2y1ÞþαXo0 near
x¼ y¼ 0, ðxn; ynÞ ¼ ð0;0Þ is a stable equilibrium. Because Eqs. (41)
and (42) yield bXodX and bYodY , ðxn; ynÞ ¼ ð0;0Þ is another
ESS. These results are consistent with those for the coordination
game without population structure; the two strategies are
bistable.
The subjective payoff version of the coordination game yields
two phenomena that are absent in the same game without
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Fig. 1. The isoclines and direction ﬁeld for the replicator dynamics of the subjective payoff snowdrift game with βX ¼ 1:4 and βY ¼ 1:3. The ﬁlled circles indicate the ESSs. (a)
p¼0.3. (b) p¼0.4. (c) p¼0.5.
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population structure. First, the polarized conﬁguration in which all
the X players adopt A and all the Y players adopt B is an stable
equilibrium if
1αX
2
opo1αY
2
: ð45Þ
When Eq. (45) is satisﬁed, Eqs. (24) and (27) are satisﬁed with
inequality such that this population is a pure-strategy ESS.
Equation (45) is satisﬁed if p is close to 1/2 or if αX or αY ð40Þ,
i.e., the asymmetry in the liking of the two actions, is large. As an
example, the attractive basins of the three equilibria for p¼0.5,
αX ¼ 0:3, and αY ¼ 0:2 are shown in Fig. 2(a). The ﬁnal conﬁg-
uration of the population depends on the initial condition. It
should be noted that stable coexistence of the opposite pure
strategies does not occur in the bimatrix coordination game (i.e.,
Battle of the Sexes game).
Second, the fraction of players employing a strategy in a
subpopulation can non-monotonically change in time. Some
non-monotonic trajectories starting from different initial condi-
tions are shown in Fig. 2(b) with p¼0.7, αX ¼ 0:2, and αY ¼ 0:2.
_x40 holds true to the right of the thick solid line in Fig. 2(b). If the
initial condition is located slightly right to this line, y ﬁrst
decreases because _yo0 holds true to the left of the thick dotted
line. If _xð40Þ is not large, the trajectory eventually crosses the
thick solid line ( _x ¼ 0) such that x starts to decrease. If the initial _x
value is large enough, the trajectory eventually crosses the thick
dotted line ð _y ¼ 0Þ such that y starts to increase. In both cases, the
trajectory shows non-monotonic behavior. Such a non-monotonic
behavior does not occur in the coordination game without
population structure.
In extensions of the Ising model (Galam, 1997) and the voter
model (Masuda et al., 2010; Masuda and Redner, 2011), which are
non-game population dynamics, idiosyncratic preferences of indi-
viduals lead to coexistence of different states, where states are
equivalent to strategies in games. The present results are consis-
tent with these results in that idiosyncratic preferences let multi-
ple states coexist when unanimity necessarily occurs in the
absence of idiosyncrasy.
4.3. Iterated prisoner's dilemma
In this section, I examine the possibility of cooperation in the
iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) in which the unconditional
cooperation (C) and unconditional defection (D) are strategies A
and B, respectively. I do not assume error in action implementa-
tion and do assume that a next round of the game between the
same pair of players occurs with probability w (0owo1). The
following results also hold true if C is replaced by the tit-for-tat
(TFT) or the so-called GRIM strategy. TFT starts with cooperation
and selects the previous action (i.e., cooperate or defect) selected
by the opponent. GRIM strategy starts with cooperation and
switches to permanent defection once the opponent ever defects.
The invariance of the following results holds true because the
payoff matrix for the IPD, i.e., Eq. (47) below, does not change
when C is replaced by TFT or GRIM.
Consider a standard payoff matrix for the single-shot prisoner's
dilemma given by
C
D
C D
bc c
b 0
 
; ð46Þ
where b and c are the beneﬁt and the cost of cooperation and
satisfy b4c40. The expected payoff matrix for the IPD in the
structureless population is given by
C
D
C D
b c
1w c
b 0
 !
: ð47Þ
If
w4wcrit 
c
b
; ð48Þ
the prisoner's dilemma is effectively transformed into a coordina-
tion game such that mutual cooperation by C and mutual defec-
tion by D are bistable (Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006).
Let us consider the situation in which two subpopulations
possess different discount factors wX and wY. In other words,
assume
aX bX
cX dX
 !
¼
b c
1wX c
b 0
 !
ð49Þ
and
aY bY
cY dY
 !
¼
b c
1wY c
b 0
 !
: ð50Þ
Because the duration of IPD is the same for the two players, I
interpret that X players put more emphasis on long-term beneﬁts
than Y players. Speciﬁcally, I assume
wYo
c
b
owX : ð51Þ
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Fig. 2. Replicator dynamics of the subjective payoff coordination game. The
magenta, green, and blue regions represent the attractive basins for
ðxn ; ynÞ ¼ ð0;0Þ, (1,1), and (1,0), respectively. The thick solid lines represent _x ¼ 0,
i.e., y¼ px=ð1pÞþð1αX Þ=2ð1pÞ. The thick dotted lines represent _y ¼ 0, i.e.,
y¼ px=ð1pÞþð1αY Þ=2ð1pÞ. (a) p¼0.5, αX ¼ 0:3, and αY ¼ 0:2. (b) p¼0.7,
αX ¼ 0:2, and αY ¼ 0:2. The thin solid curves in (b) represent trajectories
converging to ðxn; ynÞ ¼ ð0;0Þ or (1,1). For calculating the attractive basins and
individual trajectories, the Euler scheme with dt ¼ 0:005 was used. (For interpreta-
tion of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to the
web version of this paper.)
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Given Eq. (51), Eq. (5) implies _yo0 for all 0rx; yr1. There-
fore, D eventually occupies subpopulation Y. I examine the
possibility that cooperation occurs in subpopulation X. On the line
y¼0, Eq. (4) is reduced to
_x ¼ xð1xÞ ðbcÞwXpx
1wX
c
 
: ð52Þ
Therefore, the population in which D dominates in both subpo-
pulations, i.e., ðxn; ynÞ ¼ ð0;0Þ, is always a stable equilibrium of
the replicator equations of the subjective payoff IPD game. It is an
ESS because Eqs. (49) and (50) imply bXodX and bYodY ,
respectively.
Equation (52) implies that the combination of C in subpopula-
tion X and D in subpopulation Y is a stable equilibrium if
wX4wX;crit 
1
b
c
1
 
pþ1
: ð53Þ
Because Eqs. (24) and (27) are satisﬁed with inequality when Eq.
(53) holds true, this population is an ESS. A large p (i.e., large
fraction of X players) and a large beneﬁt-to-cost ratio b=c lessen
wX;crit such that cooperation would occur.
The threshold discount factors wcrit and wX;crit are compared in
Fig. 3 for some p values. The ﬁgure indicates that for a wide range
of p, the condition for cooperation in the subjective payoff case is
not very severe relative to the case without population structure.
In particular, both wcrit and wX;crit tend to unity in the limit b=c-1.
As b=c-1, it follows that wX;crit=wcrit-1=p and both wcrit and
wX;crit converge to 0. When p¼ 1=2, condition (53) coincides with
the condition for the risk dominance of C over D in the structure-
less population, i.e., w42c=ðbþcÞ.
5. Discussion
I proposed the so-called subjective payoff game and its repli-
cator dynamics. The model is mathematically a special case of the
previously analyzed model with two subpopulations (Taylor, 1979;
Schuster et al., 1981a). However, the present model is motivated by
the possibility that different players may perceive the same result
of the game to transform it to the ﬁtness in different manners. The
model shows polarization in the snowdrift and coordination
games, non-monotonic time courses in the coordination game,
and a wide margin of cooperation in the IPD. Extension of the
present model to the case of more than two strategies and more
than two subpopulations is straightforward. Generalizing the
present results for such extended models warrants future work.
The replicator dynamics of the subjective payoff game is
different from that of the bimatrix game (Section 3.5). In addition,
the subjective payoff game cannot be mapped to a model with
strategy-dependent interaction rates, which does not have multi-
ple subpopulations within each of which imitation occurs (Taylor
and Nowak, 2006). The subjective payoff game is also different
from those in which interaction is conﬁned in single subpopula-
tions, such as group selection models (Wilson, 1975; West et al.,
2007), island model (Taylor, 1992), and evolutionary set theory
(Tarnita et al., 2009).
The present model is distinct from previous models of evolu-
tion of preference (e.g., Sandholm, 2001; Dekel et al., 2007; Alger
and Weibull, 2012; Grund et al., 2013) and the so-called subjective
game (Kalai and Lehrer, 1995; Matsushima, 1997; Oechssler and
Schipper, 2003). Both in these and present models, the preference,
or the subjective payoff, is assumed to be consistent within each
individual (Gintis, 2009). In these previous models, the utility that
a player maximizes and the ﬁtness on which the selection pressure
operates are different. A player in such a model is rational enough
to be able to personally maximize the player's idiosyncratic utility.
In the present model, as in standard evolutionary models, a player
is subjected to bounded rationality and tends to imitate successful
others (i.e., social learning). The difference from standard evolu-
tionary models is that, in the present model, each player limits the
set of possible parents from whom the strategy is copied to those
with the same idiosyncratic payoff. In this way, the player can
pursue both maximization of ﬁtness via social learning and
consistency with the player's idiosyncratic preference.
The subjective payoff game does not allow internal equilibria
regardless of the stability. This result has implications in games in
which internal equilibria play an important role in structureless
populations. In the snowdrift game, a mixture of the two strategies
is stable under ordinary replicator dynamics. In contrast, in
the subjective payoff game, a slight difference in the payoff
matrices perceived by the two subpopulations leads to polariza-
tion such that the two subpopulations tend to select the opposite
strategies.
The rock–scissors–paper game comprises three strategies that
cyclically dominate one another. It is straightforward to show that
there is no internal equilibrium in the subjective payoff game with
a general number of strategies. Therefore, the subjective payoff
variant of the rock–scissors–paper game lacks the internal equili-
brium of any kind and limit cycles. Such a game behaves very
differently from the same game played in the structureless
population (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, 1998; Nowak, 2006),
bimatrix population (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, 1998; Sato
et al., 2002), and two subpopulations with different social learning
rates (Masuda, 2008); these models allow a unique internal
equilibrium. It may be interesting to examine the rock–scissors–
paper game under the current framework.
I assumed that players imitate others in the same subpopula-
tion. In fact, there may be competition of update rules between
such players and those that imitate from the entire population.
Nevertheless, at least near pure stable equilibria, the population is
considered to be resistant against invasion by mutants that imitate
from the entire population. To explain why, let us suppose that X
and Y players select A and B in the equilibrium. A mutant that
imitates from the entire population and attempts to invade
subpopulation X would sometimes select B because Y players
select B. Because A, not B, is the best response in this population,
such a mutant is considered not able to invade the subpopulation
of resident players. Therefore, the imitation rule considered in the
present study is considered to have evolutionary stability, at least
in this case.
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Appendix
In this section, I show that the equilibria given by Eqs. (38) and (40)
are ESSs of the subjective payoff snowdrift game. To this end, I use a
matrix criterion for the ESS (Taylor, 1979) accommodated to the case of
the two-strategy game.
Assume that a population given by ðxn; ynÞ satisﬁes
ðx01x0Þ RXX
xn
1xn
 
þRXY
yn
1yn
 !" #
rðxn1xnÞ RXX
xn
1xn
 
þRXY
yn
1yn
 !" #
ð54Þ
and
ðy01y0Þ RYX
xn
1xn
 
þRYY
yn
1yn
 !" #
rðyn1ynÞ RYX
xn
1xn
 
þRYY
yn
1yn
 !" #
ð55Þ
for ðx0; y0Þ ¼ ð0;0Þ; ð1;0Þ; ð0;1Þ, and ð1;1Þ. I also assume that Eqs.
(54) and (55) are satisﬁed with equality for ðx0; y0Þ ¼ ð0;0Þ if xno1
and yno1, for ðx0; y0Þ ¼ ð1;0Þ if xn40 and yno1, for ðx0; y0Þ ¼ ð0;1Þ if
xno1 and yn40, and for ðx0; y0Þ ¼ ð1;1Þ if xn40 and yn40. The
criterion dictates that ðxn; ynÞ is an ESS if and only if
ðx1x1y1y1Þ
RXX RXY
RYX RYY
 ! x1x1
y1
y1
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCAo0: ð56Þ
Here, x1a0 ðy1a0Þ if and only if the payoff of a pure A player in
subpopulation X (Y) and that of a pure B player in subpopulation X
(Y) are the same in the equilibrium of interest.
Under the snowdrift game, the assumptions for ðxn; ynÞ are
satisﬁed when ðxn; ynÞ is given by Eq. (38) or (40). Substitution of
Eqs. (13), (14), (15), (16), (33), and (34) in Eq. (56) yields
½px1þð1pÞy1  x1
1
2
βX
 
þy1
1
2
βY
  
o0: ð57Þ
For the equilibrium given by Eq. (38) to be an ESS, Eq. (57) must be
satisﬁed for x1 ¼ 0 and y1a0. For the equilibrium given by Eq. (40)
to be an ESS, Eq. (57) must be satisﬁed for x1a0 and y1 ¼ 0. In fact,
Eq. (57) is satisﬁed in both cases. Therefore, the two equilibria
are ESSs.
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